

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 099736

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE WASHDC INFO JIDDA FROM CAIRO

21 MAY 73 REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T CAIRO 1495

EXDIS

EO 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, XF, EG, SA

SUBJECT: SADAT AND FEISAL ON WAR AND PEACE

REF: CAIRO 1456 AND 1317

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO, KING FEISAL HAS URGED SADAT NOT RPT NOT TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL UNTIL EGYPT IS COMPLETELY READY AND INDICATED WHEN THAT DAY CAME, WHICH FEISAL DOES NOT SEE COMING VERY SOON, SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT STAND IN EGYPT' S WAY. OIL SUPPLY WAS NOT RPT NOT MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING HOUR' S CONVERSATION MAY 21 , SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR NAZIR GAVE ME SOME MORE BACKGROUND AND DETAILS OF FEISAL' S VISIT TO CAIRO MAY 12-13. NAZIR RECALLED HE HAD MENTIONED THAT HE WAS AMONG KING' S  
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ADVISORS WHO HAD URGED HIM TO MEET WITH SADAT, EITHER IN JIDDA OR CAIRO, TO COUNSEL MILITARY RESTRAINT. FEISAL HAD CRISPLY RESISTED THIS ADVICE; HOW, HE ASKED HIS PEOPLE, COULD THE KING WHO HAD CALLED FOR A JIHAD TO LIBERATE JERUSALEM, COUNSEL AN ARAB PRESIDENT NOT TO START THE FIGHTING?

2. WHAT TURNED THE KING AROUND WAS HIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT' S DISCUSSIONS WITH EGYPTIAN DEFENSE MINISTER AHMED ISMAIL IN SAUDI ARABIA IN EARLY MAY. IT HAD BECOME PLAIN THAT DESPITE BRAVADO AND SABRE RATTLING, FORCES AT ISMAIL' S DISPOSAL WERE IN NO WAY READY FOR A SUCCESSFUL BATTLE. FEISAL TOLD ISMAIL THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD HAVE TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE WHOLE ARAB NATION IF HE ADVISED SADAT TO GO INTO A FIGHT UNTIL HE COULD COME OUT A WINNER. AFTER THESE DISCUSSIONS, FEISAL PERCEIVED THAT HE HAD BETTER TALK TO SADAT HIMSELF, SO HE AGREED TO STOP ON HIS WAY TO PARIS.

3. DURING THIS VISIT, FEISAL NEVER LEFT KUBBEH PALACE; HE HAD A COUPLE OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH SADAT, AND SEVERAL MEETINGS AT WHICH THEIR ADVISORS WERE PRESENT, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR NAZIR. NAZIR IS CONFIDENT THAT, THE WAY FEISAL RUNS HIS GOVERNMENT ( ASSURING THAT HIS IN- GROUP KNOWS WHAT IS GOING ON), HE AND SAQQAF AND KAMEL ADHAM WOULD KNOW ABOUT ALL THAT HAPPENED EVEN IN THE PRIVATE SESSIONS. THE IDEA OF SAUDI ARABIA USING ITS OIL SUPPLY IN CONNECTION WITH A WAR, WHICH I TOLD NAZIR THE EGYPTIANS HAD MENTIONED TO DE BORCHGRAVE, HE SAID FLATLY HAD NEVER COME UP. MOREOVER, NAZIR ADDED, THAT IS NOT THE WAY FEISAL WANTS TO RUN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING OIL.

4. WHAT DID COME UP WAS THAT SADAT TOLD FEISAL HE HAD TO UNDERTAKE A MILITARY ACTION IN ORDER TO BREAK THE IMPASSE AND FORCE THE GREAT POWERS TO " DO SOMETHING." FEISAL HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT STAND IN SADAT' S WAY IF AND WHEN HE WERE READY TO WIN WHATEVER HE STARTED, BUT IT IS PLAIN TO EVERYONE THAT EGYPT IS NOT READY NOW. BEFORE THE ASSEMBLED GROUP, FEISAL TURNED  
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TO DEFENSE MINISTER ISMAIL AND REMINDED HIM OF WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT ISMAIL' S RESPONSIBILITY; FEISAL THEN TOLD SADAT THAT IT WAS SADAT' S RESPONSIBILITY NOT TO BRING HUMILIATION ON THE WHOLE ARAB NATION BY FORCING AHMED ISMAIL TO START A WAR THAT WOULD BRING ONLY REPETITION OF THE DISASTER OF 1967.

5. THE SAUDI SIDE WAS CONSIDERABLY SURPRISED AND CONCERNED THAT DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS, SADAT AMONG OTHER THINGS REFERRED AT EMOTIONAL LENGTH TO SOMETHING HE SAID HAD APPEARED IN MAAREV PURPORTING TO DESCRIBE A MEETING OF ISRAELI GENERALS; SADAT WORKED HIMSELF UP INTO CITING THEIR REPORTED ATTITUDES AS ANOTHER REASON WHY HE HAD TO RESUME HOSTILITIES. NAZIR TELLS ME THE SAUDI SIDE WERE CONCERNED THAT SADAT IS SO EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE AS TO FALL FOR ISRAELI PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

6. AFTER ALL THIS, THE SAUDIS ARE NO RPT NO MORE CERTAIN THAN ANYONE ABOUT WHAT SADAT WILL DO. ( NAZIR CONTRASTED WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT HOW FEISAL RUNS THINGS WITH THE OBVIOUS CIRCUMSTANCE THAT MOST OF THE PEOPLE AROUND SADAT DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS , INCLUDING BOTH VICE PRESIDENTS AND MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE, WERE HEARING THEIR LEADER'S VIEWS FOR THE FIRST TIME.)

7. I RELATED MY OWN EFFORTS TO GET ACROSS TO ZAYYAT THE US VIEW OF THE ROAD TO PEACE, AND ZAYYAT'S RESPONSE ( CAIRO 1317).

8. OTHER MATTERS DEALT WITH DURING FEISAL'S VISIT WERE SADAT'S NEEDS FOR MONEY AND OIL. ACCORDING TO NAZIR, FEISAL SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO LEND EGYPT SOME MORE MONEY IF AND WHEN THEY PRESENT A DEPENDABLE REPAYMENT SCHEDULE; THIS HAS NOT YET APPEARED. IN RESPONSE TO A SADAT REQUEST, FEISAL DID AGREE TO LET HIM HAVE 750,000 TONS OF OIL. EVEN AFTER THIS WAS ARRANGED, NAZIR SAYS HE HAD TO PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOT GOING TO PROVIDE THE TANKERS, AND THAT IF EGYPT WANTS THE OIL THEY HAVE TO SEND THEIR OWN TO PICK IT UP.

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9. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION, NAZIR SAID THAT FEISAL IS CONSIDERING GOING FROM SWITZERLAND ( WHERE HE IS CURRENTLY) TO MEET KING HASSAN IN RABAT. SADAT AND BOUMOUDIENNE WOULD GO TOO, BUT NOT QADAFFI. WHEN I REMARKED THAT THIS MIGHT MAKE QADAFFI SORE, NAZIR SAID THAT SADAT HAD TOLD FEISAL HE THINKS QADAFFI MUST BE " NUTS." FEISAL DISPLAYED SURPRISE THAT SADAT HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF THIS EARLIER AND SADAT REPLIED TO THE GENERAL EFFECT THAT FEISAL SHOULD NOT PUT WORDS IN HIS MOUTH ABOUT WHAT HE MAY HAVE SAID BEFORE; HIS CONCLUSION ABOUT QADAFFI IS THE CURRENT ONE.

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